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TEACHING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
THROUGH SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
Jill E. Fisch·
Litigation abuse has received considerable public attention in the
last several years. The shareholder suit is at the forefront of this
debate . Corporate America, claiming that strike suits are crippling
business profitability, has pressed for litigation reform. 1 Regulators
at a variety of levels have responded to complaints of excessive
litigation.2 At the same time, defenders of shareholder litigation
stress its importance and warn that efforts to curtail litigation will
reduce management accountability.3
The debate, which is a lively one, offers a variety of teaching
issues. Through the material on shareholder litigation, one can
explore the basic themes of corporate law and corporate governance,
including questions about the appropriate degree of separation of
ownership and control in the public corporation, the relative merits
of different governance mechanisms that seek to reduce agency costs
and increase management accountability, and the appropriate role
of litigation in business law. This Essay attempts to illustrate the
relevance of shareholder litigation to some of the major themes I
cover in the basic Corporations course.

Professor, Fordham Law School.
See, e.g., Adam F. Ingber, IOb-5 Or Not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform
Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 351, 363 (1993) (describing lobbying
group, the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits (CEASS), formed by approxim ately
300 corporate, accounting, and financial institutions, to press Congress to reform securities
litigation); Barbara Franklin, Business Council Wages War on Derivative Suits, N . Y.L.J. , July
8, 1993, at 5 (recounting lobbying e ffort by New York Business Council in support of bill to
restrict derivative litigation in New York state).
2 See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994) (observing
particular risk of abusive litigation presented by shareholder suits against secondary
defendants in connection with decision to reject aiding and abetting liability under section
lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform:
The Long and Winding Road to the Priuate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus.
LAW. 335, (1996) (explaining concern over abusive litigation that led to adoption of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act).
3
See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, New York May Limit Stockholder Suits: Governor, Business
Groups Back Bill to Giue Directors Veto Over Filings, 80 A.B.A. J. 24 (Mar. 1994) (quoting
shareholder lawyer Ed Labaton).
•
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Resisting the cynical view that the corporation always wins, my
emphasis in this material is on the extent to which the rules
established through shareholder litigation influence primary
conduct. Thus, discussion focuses on the role of litigation in setting
norms of corporate behavior and deterring corporate misconduct.
The material also enables students to evaluate the role of the
market and to consider whether regulation is necessary or appropri
ate as a response to market problems.
This analysis is most effective in the context of specific examples.
Recently I have used two particular topics-executive compensation
and corporate philanthropy-as a basis for students to evaluate the
effectiveness of shareholder litigation and to compare litigation to
other governance mechanisms. This process allows students to
assess critically the traditional wisdom on the limite d role afforded
to shareholder litigation as a means of challenging business
decisionmaking.
Toward these ends, I structure my course to include a separate
unit on shareholder litigation, which I schedule near the end of the
semester. By this time, my students are familiar with the applica
ble substantive law, including fiduciary duty, the business judgment
rule, and the special rules applicable to takeover litigation. We have
also extensively considered the problems associate d with the
separation of ownership and control and alternative governance
mechanisms addressed to these problems, including the shareholder
voting process, shareholder proposals, control contests, and
mandatory disclosure. As a result, in addition to introducing
students to the structure and mechanics of shareholder litigation,
the unit serves to review and reinforce the previously covered
background principles and to locate shareholder litigation within
the relevant contract and agency principles of corporate law. 4

4 The shareholder primacy principle can also be examined through the lens of
shareholder litigation. Students can weigh the reasoning of cases that reserve to sharehold
ers the right to bri n g derivative suits to redress a breach of fiduciary duty against the
stakeholder theories of the corporation. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy
Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (describing history and influen ce of shareholder
primacy).
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I. THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

As Berle and Means observed, the separation of ownership and
control in the modern public corporation has led to managerial
control over corporate decisionmaking.5 Economics scholars defend
specialized management as efficient,6 yet the agency costs associ·
ated with the separation reduce this efficiency and create the risks
of shirking and self· dealing. 7 Corporate law responds to these risks
with a variety of governance mechanisms-mandatory disclosure,
shareholder voting, the market for corporate control, and share·
holder litigation.
None of the mechanisms operates perfectly. Disclosure is costly
and sacrifices the confidentiality of business operations in favor of
greater transparency.8
Voting suffers from collective action
problems such as shareholder apathy, as well as management
control of the agenda. The market for corporate control is an overly
blunt tool for ongoing management discipline and is subject to
extensive market and legal constraints.9 And shareholder litigation,
because of its representative nature as well as collective action
problems, offers the possibility of litigation abuse.

See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEA.t'!S, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
68 ( 1 932) (describing how separation of ownership and control in public
corporation has led to effective control by management).
6 See, e.g., Lynn L. Dallas, Two lvfodels of Corporate Gouemance: Beyond Berle and
Afeans, 2 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19,22-24 (1988) (describing efficiency model of firm, under
which separation of ownership and control is viewed as efficient for society); E ugene F. Fama
& Ivlichael C. Jensen, Separatio n of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983)
(arguing that separation of ownership and controi is efficient for m of specialization).
7
See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter , Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's
Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1 35 1 , 1 367 (1989) (identifyin g "risk of managerial
shirking and diversion" as "the price of operating through manager 'age nts' "); Geoffrey S.
Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency
Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 1 47, 1160 ( 1 98 5) (describing agency costs resulting from separation
of ownership and control).
8 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Inuestors: A lvfarket Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2 359, 2373-8 1 (1998) (identifying and evaluatin g costs and benefits
of mandatory disclosure).
9 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents P/atching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Foice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 8 1 1, 832 (1992) (identifying deficiencies in market for
corporate control as mechanism for disciplining management).
5
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In addition to the specific deficiencies of particular corporate
governance tools, the general effort to increase mana gement
accountability poses a cost to business efficiency. 1 0 Economics
teaches that mana gement must enjoy a de gree of discretion to
operate effectively. For that discretion to exist, shareholders must
be limited in their ability to second- guess mana gement decisions.
Extensive shareholder interference with mana gerial decisions,
through voting, liti gation, or otherwise, threatens to undermine the
efficiency gains generated by the separation of ownership and
control. Moreover, excessive accountability can make mana gers
risk-averse and reduce corporate profitability.
As a result of these concerns, corporate law moderates the degree
to which shareholders can use governance mechanisms to oversee
mana gement decisionmakin g . For example, shareholders have the
right to vote p roactively on very few subjects; the board of directors
decides on the slate of director nominees, whether to propose a
charter amendment, and whether to approve a mer ger. 1 1 State and
federal law consider the majority of ordinary business decisions to
be outside the scope of shareholder votin g authority. 12 Similarly,
the effectiveness of the takeover market is largely subject to
mana gement control, as the board, through the use of p oison pills,
staggered boards, and other defensive tactics, can preclude share
holders from sellin g their stock in a control contest. Finally,
shareholder litigation is limited by the business judgment rule,
which effectively shields most mana gement decisions from judicial
review. 1 3

10

See, e.g., Joh n H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship
Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1456
n.51 (1994) (describing how interference with management autonomy by reducing discretion
or increasing accountability m ay sacrifice efficiency provided by centralized m anagem ent).
11
See, e.g., Alexander G. Simpson, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School: Now is
the Winter of our Discontent, 43 DUKE L.J. 189, 203-04 (1993) (explaining that shareholders
are permitted to vote on "major structural issues").
12
See id. at 203-08 (describing state and federal law restrictions on shareholder control
over most other corporate decisions).
13 See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 5-19 (4th ed.
1993) (describing business judgment rule).
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II. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND LITIGATION ABUSE
A. THE STRUCTURE OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

Shareholder litigation comes in two forms. The derivative suit
enables shareholders to obtain redress for harms inflicted on the
.
corporation, typically by corporate management. 14 Through the
derivative mechanism an individual shareholder can initiate suit,
but the suit is brought on the corporation's behalf and the corpora
tion, not the shareholder, receives any recovery. 15 The justification
for allowing shareholders to initiate derivative suits is the concern
that corporations are unlikely to sue officers and directors for harms
to the corporation, because management controls litigation deci
swns.
Direct suits, in contrast, are attempts to redress harms inflicted
on the shareholders directly. 16 In corporate law, one of the most
important categories is litigation under the federal securities laws,
addressing incomplete or inaccurate disclosure in connection with
securities transactions . 17 Securities fraud litigation is typically
initiated by purchasers or sellers of securities, who rely on misinfor
mation conveyed by corporations or corporate management.18
Both types of suits suffer from incentive problems. Although the
aggregate damages at stake in shareholder litigation may be
considerable, because most shareholders have a limited amount
invested in any given corporation, their individual stakes in
litigation are quite small. Accordingly, it is neither cost effective for
most shareholders to investigate potential causes of action nor for
them to initiate litigation. This problem, which is common to much
small-stake or small-claimant litigation, is partially addressed by

14
See, e.g., Jones v. H . F . Ahmanson & Co. , 460 P . 2d 464, 470 (Cal. 1969) (explaining
nature of derivative suit).
15 Jd.
IG
See id. (distinguishing direct suits from derivative suits).
17
See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV.
3, 6 (1999) (describing significance of shareholder suits in corporate law).
18
See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limitin g
standing to defrauded purchasers a n d sellers).
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allowing representative suits such as class actions. 1 9 Both securities
fraud class actions and shareholder derivative suits allow a single
shareholder to initiate a suit based on the aggregate harm.
Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs recovery is limited to his or her
damages (and because, in the case of a derivative suit, the plaintiff
recovers only indirectly), representative litigation does not create a
substantial incentive for plaintiffs to litigate. It does, however,
create an incentive for plaintiffs counsel to litigate.20
The evolution of both class actions and derivative litigation has
departed further from the traditional litigation structure by creating
an entrepreneurial role for plaintiffs' counsel.2 1 Under the current
regime, counsel does not look to individual plaintiffs for payment of
legal fees. Instead, counsel in a successful shareholder suit receives
a court-awarded fee, which is typically paid out of the damages
recovered. The size of the counsel fee may be based on the number
of hours devoted to the case or the size of the recovery, but the
court's evaluation generally considers the extent of the benefit
provided by the litigation to the plaintiff class. As a result, plain
tiffs' counsel may, and often does, recover substantially more from
the suit than any individual shareholder. At the same time, counsel
has an incentive to choose suits with large aggregate damage
claims.
The growth of the entrepreneurial lawyer creates a risk of
litigation abuse. The risk stems from several factors.22 First, the
lawyers who file suit may have a greater stake than any individual

19

See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 3 9

ARiZ. L . REV. 53.'3, 5 5 1 ( 1997) [hereinafter Fisch, Class Action Reform] (explaining h o w class

action model permits cost-effective ligation in sm all claimant cases).
20
See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (observing that " the real incentive
to bring derivative actions is usually not the hope of return to the corporation but the hope
of handsome fees to be recovered by plaintiffs' counsel"); Roberta Rom ano, The Shareholder
Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 63-65, 84 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (describing
empirical study of derivative suit settlements which finds that attorneys, not s hareholders,
are principal beneficiaries).
21
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Effidency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 ( 1 987) (describing
entrepreneurial role of plaintiffs' counsel); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and
the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 167, 1 7 1-76 ( 1 997) [hereinafter Fisch, Role
of the Plaintiffl (describing evolution of class action away from traditional litiga t ion model).
22
See Fisch. Role of the Plaintiff, supra note 2 1 , at 173 (describing incentives created by
ciass action structure).
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shareholder, creating an incentive for the lawyers to make litigation
decisions in their own, rather than their clients' interests. The
problem is aggravated by the relatively small stakes of most
shareholders, who are unlikely to monitor counsel's decisionmaking
carefully. Additionally, the lawyer-client relationship is subject to
its own set of agency costs. The lawyer seeks to maximize recovery
subject to constraints of time and effort. The lawyer may also be
risk averse, preferring a quick settlement that does not involve the
investment of considerable litigation efforts over a lengthy and
uncertain trial. Finally, the lawyer will prefer a recovery that
maximizes his or her fee award, rather than one that maximizes the
benefits to the plaintiffs.
Critics of lawyer-driven litigation argue that lawyer control of
litigation decisions leads to several problems. 23 First, they claim
that lawyers generate excessive litigation, filing suits for their
nuisance value, in an effort to generate quick settlements. Second,
they warn that lawyers may make inappropriate settlement
decisions without regard to merit in order to secure their fee
awards. This may result in meritorious cases being settled too
cheaply. Finally, lawyers may seek to file cases that, because they
merely transfer money from one set of shareholders to another,
produce little net value from the shareholders' perspective.
In corporate litigation, a number of additional factors contribute
to the problem. Corporate officers and directors are shielded from
most exposure to liability for damages through mechanisms such as
indemnification and insurance.24 These mechanisms insulate
individual executives from most financial responsibility for corpo
rate wrongdoing and may cause them to settle rather than incur the
aggravation and exposure associated with extensive litigation.
Additionally, the limitations on insurance policies and indemnifica
tion provisions create a risk that executives who are found liable of
serious wrongdoing may lose their coverage. Settlement agreements

23
See Fisch, Class Action Reform, supra note 19, at 535 (recounting concerns about
litigation abuse that led to adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 99 5) .
z.,
See Reinier H . Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and t h e Costs o f Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 86 1 -62 (1 984) (describing degree to which officers and directors
may be insulated from liability by indemnification and insurance).
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can be drafted to insure that management's conduct meets the
requirements for coverage.
The extent to which the foregoing risks are realized-that is, the
extent of litigation abuse that actually occurs-is unclear. Empiri
cal studies have attempted to quantify litigation abuse by examining
settlement statistics. In one of the most widely cited studies, for
example, Janet Cooper Alexander evaluated the settlements in six
securities class actions and concluded that all the suits settled for
roughly the same percentage of the alleged damages, leading her to
conclude that the suits were settled without regard to their merits. 25
The problems inherent in measuring damages in shareholder suits
create some difficulty in relying on these statistics, however. For
example, Professors Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman conducted
a study of the industry-wide price declines in the stocks that were
the subject of Alexander's study and found that when industry
effects were taken into account, Alexander's conclusions were
seriously jeopardized.2 6
Moreover, any attempt to evaluate the utility of shareholder
litigation cannot focus exclusively on after-the -fact damage awards,
but must also consider the effect of litigation on management
accountability. Defenders of shareholder litigation argue that the
threat of litigation operates as a substantial deterrent to manage
ment misconduct.27 If viable litigation reduces the incidence of
wrongdoing, it provides benefits for which empirical studie s do not
account.

25

See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 5 1 6 - 1 7 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (studying six suits in which
settlements ranged from 20% to 27.35% of allowable recovery; two other cases were studied
which settled for smaller amounts due to factors unrelated to their merits).
26
See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YAlJE L.J.
2053, 2083-84 ( 1 995) (finding that, a fter adjusting for industry-wide effects on stock price,
settlements in Alexander's study ranged from 23. 1 1 % to 79. 7 7% of recoverable damages).
27 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 643 (1 996) (recommending that securities litigation be refocused to m ake
deterrence the primary objective).
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B. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE RISK O F LITIGATION ABUSE

Business law has responded to the potential for abusive share
holder litigation in two ways. First, the law limits the claims that
may be raised in shareholder litigation. The business judgment rule
is the most prominent of these limitations. By reducing the role of
the courts in evaluating the merits of business decisions, the
business judgment rule effectively insulates most management
decisionmaking from judicial review.2 8 Moreover, because the
business judgment rule imposes a threshold pleading burden on a
plaintiff-shareholder, it allows courts to dismiss much litigation at
an early stage. By reducing the cost to fight meritless litigation, the
Tule reduces the potential for nuisance suits.
Federal securities law contains similar substantive limitations.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 29 creates a safe
harbor for forward-looking statements, effectively allowing corpora
tions that comply with the statutory requirements to insulate
themselves from liability. 30 By adopting a proportionate liability
scheme, the Reform Act also reduces the liability exposure of
secondary defendants. The United States Supreme Court's decision
in Central Bank v. First Interstate, 31 which rejected aiding and
abetting liability, further limits the ability of plaintiffs to sue
secondary wrongdoers. Together the statute and the Central Bank
decision substantially curtail the ability of shareholders to sue deep
pocket defendants who have limited involvement in the challenged
transactions.3 2 The net result is to reduce the extent to which
28
See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modem Process of Financial
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1 273, 1 3 1 6 ( 1 9 9 1 )
(describing difficulty for shareholder in attacking management decisions because "[t]he
business j udgment rule virtually insulates all day-to-day decisions of management from
attack").
29 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 99 5, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(coditl.ed at 15 U . S . C . §§ 77a et seq. ( 1995)).
30
See, e.g., Harris v. IVAX Corp . , 182 F . 3d 799, 803 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 999) (describing scope of
safe harbor and concl uding that it insulates defendants from liability for certain fal se and
misleading statements and om issions).
31
5 1 1 U . S . 164 ( 1 994).
: J z See, e.g., Jill E . F i sc h The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability
Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 293, 1303-05 ( 1999) (evaluating
combined impact of Reform Act and Central Bank decision on liability exposure of secondary
defendants).
,
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frivolous litigation can increase the costs associated with employing
the services of lawyers, accountants and investment bankers.
The alternative to substantive limitations on liability exposure is
procedural gatekeeping. State statutory and common-law rules
impose a variety of procedural requirements on a shareholder who
seeks to bring a derivative suit. 33 Plaintiffs must make a pre-suit
demand that the corporation file suit or demonstrate that such a
demand would be futile.34 Plaintiffs must meet the standing
requirement of the contemporaneous ownership rule. 35 In many
states, plaintiffs must post a bond as security for the corporation's
expenses in the event that a court finds the suit was meritless.36
Even when the plaintiff has complied with these requirements, the
corporation may wrest control of the suit and have it dismissed over
plaintiffs objection.3 7
I devote particular attention in class to demand and dismissal of
derivative litigation. The key issue in derivative litigation is
whether the suit would benefit the corporation. The question posed
by the demand and dismissal rules is who should make that
determination.
At one extreme, some courts have described
litigation as a business decision no different from any other and
accordingly held that the business judgment rule applie s without
qualification to a board's decision to refuse a demand or terminate
litigation. 38 Other cases have recognized the structural problems
associated with allowing directors to decide whether to sue their
fellow directors and given the courts a more active role in exercising

33 See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free R iders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects
of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of
General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 435-37 (1988) (explaining common-law and
statutory procedura l restrictions on derivative litigation).
·'''
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (describing dema n d requirement).
35 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§626 (b) (Mcfunney 1999) (requiring that plaintiff be a
shareholder "at the time of bri n ging the action" and "at the time of the transaction of which
he complains").
36
See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 627 (JvlcKinney 1999) (imposing requirement that
plaintiff post security for expenses).
3;
See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.Zd 779 (Del. 1981) (describing circumstances
under which properly filed derivative suit may be dismissed by corporation).
38 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N . E.Zd 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979) (ap p l ying deferential
business judgment rule scrutiny to decision of special litigation committee to terminate
shareholder derivative suit).
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their independent judgment as to whether dismissal is proper.39
Notably, however, courts give little deference to the shareholders'
judgment, despite the theoretical objective of providing some
shareholder control over litigation decisions. No state, for example,
puts the issue of whether litigation should be pursued to a share
holder vote. Nor do courts solicit the opinions of substantial
shareholders as to whether the litigation should proceed.
In light of these concerns, we discuss the universal demand
requirement of the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Governance.40 A universal demand requirement increases the
degree of management control at the expense of shareholder
authority. Because the New York legislature discussed adopting the
universal demand requirement several years ago,4 1 we have the
opportunity to consider the legislative role in revising corporate
governance rules. My involvement in responding to the legislature's
request for assistance in evaluating the proposal allows me to give
the students detailed information on the process, including explain
ing the identity and objectives of the bill's proponents, the concerns
expressed by members of the legislature, and the role of lawyers,
through the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in
addressing the proposal. 42 Ultimately, the New York legislature
failed to adopt the proposal. Perhaps this failure was due in part to
a carefully drafted evaluation by the Bar Association warning that

39 See, e.g., Zapata, 430 A 2d at 787 (rejectin g application of p ure business judgment
a nalysis to dismissal decision). Further complications are created by the process of delegating
the decision to a n independent committee. We discuss the increasing reliance by courts on
procedural safeguards, such as disinterested directors, independent counsel and extensive
investigations and reports, the costs associated with this review, and the appropriate scope
of judicial scrutiny.
�0 See fu\-!ERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7.03 (1992) (proposing u niversal demand requirement except in cases i n
w h i c h corporation would suffer irreparable injury); see also Carol B. Swanson, Juggling
Shareholder R ights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77
MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1353-56 (1993) (describing universal demand requirement).
41
See, e.g., Legislative Agenda: Bills Aim to Attract More Business to New York, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 16, 1995, at 5 (describin g New York bill); Jost, supra note 3 (discussing same).
'12 I chaired a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which
submitted comments to the legislature that included recommended changes i n the proposed
bill. See Legislative Agenda, supra note 41 (discussing support and opposition for proposal,
including positions of Business Council and plaintiffs' bar).
.
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legislative reform might disrupt the existing balance between
addressing wrongdoing and protecting corporate decisionmaking. 43
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act follows the state law
approach of adopting procedural safeguards in an effort to curb
litigation abuse.44 The heightened pleading standard of the Reform
Act provides a threshold burden, like the business judgment rule,
that allows early dismissal of purported nuisance litigation. 45 By
giving defendants the opportunity to have cases dismissed without
incurring the time and cost of discovery, the Reform Act reduces the
incentive for them to settle non-meritorious cases. The lead plaintiff
provision is designed to create a procedural structure for reducing
the agency problems associated with lawyer-driven litigation by
vesting a lead plaintiff with greater control over litigation
decisionmaking.46 Finally, the Reform Act adopted a variety of
restrictions intended to prevent the use of professional plaintiffs,
including provisions that limit the number of lawsuits in which a
person can serve as class representative,47 ban referral fees to
brokers,48 and prohibit class representatives from receiving special
compensation.49
Again, because of my involvement in reviewing these reforms and
the predecessor proposals in the Republican Contract with America,
I am able to situate the existing statute within the framework of the
alternative approaches that were considered and rejected.50 We

'13

See id. (describing recommendations of City Bar committee).
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified at 15 U. S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1995)).
45
See, e.g., Richard H. Walker & .J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 102327 (1998) (describing statutory language, legislative history and cases inte rpreting Reform
Act's p leading standard).
46 See Fisch, Class Action Reform, supra note 19, at 537-50 (discussing l e a d p laintiff
provision).
47 See 15 U. S. C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi) (1997); 15 U. S. C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (limiting
individuals to serving as lead p laintiffs in no more than five securities class actions during
three-yea r period).
48
15 U. S. C. § 780(c)(8).
1�
15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4).
5°
For example, I p articipated in a p a ne l discussion at the City Bar Association that
considered H.R. 10, the "Contract with America." H.R. 10: Common Sense Legal Reform or
Unequal Access to Justice (Roundtable Discussion at the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Feb. 7, 1995). I also drafted comments on various legislative proposals on behalf
of the City Bar Association .
44
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discuss procedural proposals such as loser pays51 and guardians ad
litem, 52 as well as substantive proposals such as imposing an actual
knowledge standard and eliminating fraud on the market.53 In
addition to evaluating the merits of these alternatives, my students
are able to understand the evolution of a statute and appreciate the
role of compromise and moderation.
The procedural and substantive limitations on shareholder
litigation can best be understood as creating a balance or trade-off
between two competing objectives. On the one hand, these limita
tions reduce both the potential for litigation abuse and the extent to
which excessive litigation will unduly interfere with management
decisionmaking. At the same time, the cost of these effects is
diminished management accountability. By reducing the ability of
plaintiff shareholders to litigate, these restrictions cause corpora
tions and their shareholders to sacrifice some degree of compensa
tion for damages caused by management malfeasance. In addition,
by reducing the expected likelihood that management will be held
accountable for wrongdoing, the restrictions reduce the deterrent
effect of corporate law's liability rules.
III. THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN ADDRESSING
CURRENT GOVERNANCE ISSUES

The foregoing theoretical and legal analysis is more interesting
and comprehensible when it is situated within the factual context
of particular corporate decisions. In my course, I focus on two areas
in which managerial decisionmaking may be suspect and explore the
effectiveness of shareholder litigation in addressing the potential for
management self-dealing. These examples also illustrate the
relative advantages and disadvantages of shareholder litigation in
relation to other governance mechanisms.
51
See, e.g., D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud us. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching
An Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 597-98 (1.995) (describing loser-pay provisions
that were initially part of bills that became Reform Act).
52 An earlier version of the Senate bill that became the Reform Act proposed guardians
ad litem and p laintiffs' steering committees. S. 240, 104th Cong. §§ 101(c), 103 (1995). These
provisions did not survive in the enacted legislation.
53 See Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995)
(requiring proof of actual reliance in 10b-5 actions).
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A. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Commentators have criticized the growth of executive compensa
tion in the 1980s and 1990s.54 Executive compensation is frequently
described as excessive in comparison to average worker salaries, 55
the salaries paid to foreign executives, 56 and the value added by top
executives. 57 Executive compensation has been at the forefront of
corporate governance concerns for the last several years. The same
media that bemoans shareholder litigation as abusive and excessive
decries the large salaries paid to American executives as excessive
and wasteful. 58
Executive compensation also presents the
prototypical opportunity for management self-dealing. Although
state corporation law typically vests the board of directors with the
authority to set the salaries of top corporate executives, there are a
variety of reasons to question the ability of a board to exercise
independent judgment over compensation decisions. Indeed many
experts have concluded that executive compensation is not dictated

54 See, e.g., James E. Heard, Shareholders Focus Concerns on Executiue Compensation
at 1992 Annual Meetings, 6 INSIGHTS 20 ( 1 9 92) (describing average CEO compensation as
increasing by more than 200% during the 1 980s).
5 5 See John A. Byrne et al., That Eye-Popping Executiue Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 25, 1 994, at
5 5 (describing "gulf between the executive suite and the shop floor" as "as wide as a canyon");
Tim Smart, Pay Gap Widens Between Worker, Boss, WASH. P OST, Aug . 30, 1999, at A6
(reporting that "the sixth annual survey of executive compensation by the Institute for Policy
Studies and United for a Fair Economy, finds the ratio o f top executive to factory worker pay
has exploded this decade to 4 1 9 to 1 last year from 42 to 1 in 1 980").
56 See Don L. Boroughs et al. , Winter of Discontent, U.S. N EW S & WORLD REP., Jan. 22,
1 996, at 47, 54 (comparing ratio between compensation of CEO and that o f average worker
i n United States to that in Germany); Uma V. Sridharan, CEO Influence and Executiue
Compensation, 3 1 FIN. REV. 5 1 ( 1 996) (describing high level of U.S. CEO compensation
relative to that in Japan).
5 7 See Robert J. McCartney, Executiue Pay Rises, as Profits Fall, WASH. POST, Apr. 25 ,
1 992, at Cl (stating that average CEO compensation at U.S. corporations rose during 1 9 9 1
even though profits fell sharply); Irwin M. Stelzer, Are CEOs Overpaid?, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Winter 1997, at 26, 32 (reviewing several e mpirical studies which conclude that
link between CEO pay and corporate performance is "somewhere between weak and non
existent").
58 See, e.g., John A. Byrne, The Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1 991, at 90
(describing attention and controversy over executive pay levels).
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by market forces and that corporate CEOs exert undue influence
over their compensation packages. 59
Shareholder litigation is rarely successful in challenging
Courts traditionally treat executive
compensation decisions.
compensation as a routine business decision that is virtually
immune from judicial review under the business judgment rule. 60
Indeed, executive compensation seems to be a prototypical subject
for application of the business judgment rule. As the court in the
classic Heller v. Boylan61 decision explained, courts are ill-equipped
to review compensation decisions.62 Moreover, although the doctrine
of waste remains available as a basis for challenging particularly
egregious cases of overcompensation, as evidenced in Rogers v.
Hill,63 the case is perhaps most noteworthy for its aberrational
nature.64
The recent case of In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation65
provides a typical illustration of the utility of shareholder litigation
as a tool for challenging compensation decisions. Shareholders
brought suit based on the Disney board's decision to award a
severance package of $140 million to Michael Ovitz after concluding
that his employment as president of Disney for fourteen months was
not working out. 66 The court in Disney was unswayed by allegations
that the severance package was "larger than almost anyone
anywhere will receive in the lifetime of any of the parties, and
perhaps larger than any ever paid."67 Despite its size, the court

59
One of the best-known compensation consultants, now a critic of excessive pay, wrote
a book several years ago describing a process by which a CEO could get his or her board of
directors to approve virtually any compensation package unconstrained by legal or market
forces. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991).
60
29 N.Y. S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. C t. 1941).
61

62

Id.
Id.

at 679-80.
U.S. 582 (1933).
See, e.g. , Steiner v. Meyerson, No. CIV.A.13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July
19, 1995) (observing that non-fraudulent (and non-negligent) claims against disinterested
parties that meet legal standard of waste may be "rarest of all" and "possibly non-existent");
id. at *8 (holding that grant of immediately exercisable stock options does not constitute
corporate waste "[s]o long as there is some rational basis for directors to conclude that the
a mount and for m of compensation is appropriate").
65 731 A.2d 342 (Del. 1998).
66
Id. at 350, 352.
67 Id. at 350.
63
61

289
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explained that conventional corporate governance laws applied , and
concluded that the suit was barred by the demand requirement and
the business judgment rule.68
The case demonstrates that the procedural barriers to derivative
litigation effectively preclude challenges to executive compensation.
The Disney court was unpersuaded by plaintiffs' allegations that the
decisionmaking process leading to the package was defective.
Plaintiffs demonstrated that Ovitz was a close personal friend of
Disney CEO Michael Eisner69 and presented a variety of conflicts
and personal ties between members of the Disney board and Eisner,
suggesting that the board of directors could not fairly evaluate the
compensation.70 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Disney
board was sufficiently capable of exercising independent business
judgment.7 1 This decision foreclosed further judicial inquiry.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply
with the demand requirement.
Rogers v. HilC2 and Disney pose threshold questions about how
to evaluate executive compensation. Are the media claims of
overpayment justified? Can we compare the salaries of top execu
tives with those of football players and movie stars?73 These
68

Id. a t 350- 5 1 , 36 1 , 365.
ld. at 355.
70 Id. a t 356-6 1 .
71
ld. a t 36 1 . The court found the board sufficiently indepen dent notwithstanding
widespread public criticism of the Disney board's lack of independence. See, e.g., Joh n A.
Byrne, The Best and Worst Boards, Bus. WK. , Dec. 8, 1997, a t 90 (naming D is ney's directors
worst board in America in its second annua l a nalysis of corporate governance); B r uce Orwall
& Joann S. Lublin, The Plutocracy: If a Co m pany P rospers, Should its Directors Behave by
the Book?, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 24, 1997, a t A 1 (detailing personal ties betwe e n several board
members and Eisner); Paul Tharp, Eisner 's Problems Put Him Deeper into Mouse Hole, N.Y.
POST, May 20, 1 999, at 36 (stating that "[j)ust three of Disney's 16 directors are fully
independent, and the rest are either friends or financial associates").
72
289 U.S. 582 (1 933).
73 At a rece nt conference, Professor Melvin Eisenberg drew a comparison between
compensation of top executives and that of professional athletes, suggesting that the a thletes
were compensated more appropriately based o n past performance. Panel Discussion,
Compensation: Balancing Accountability and Ince ntives, The Federalist Society, Fourth
Annual Conference on Corporate Governance Issues (Sept. 16, 1 999) [hereinafter Federalist
Society Conference] . But see Sam Walker & Jonathan B. Weinbach, All-Stars of '99, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 3, 1999, at Wl (describing lack of correlation between pay and performance
among top football players); Top Executive Pay Peeves The Public, Bus. WK. , June 25, 1 984,
a t 15 (describing poll finding that " [o] n the scale of public tolerance for the amount of money
they make, executives rank a little above star professional athletes").
69
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questions lead to a discussion of pay-for-performance. Recent trends
toward incentive-based compensation have generated a variety of
innovative compensation tools and have increased the percentage of
executive compensation that is, at least nominally, performance
based. 74 At the same time, these trends have apparently accelerated
the inflation of compensation packages.75 An alternative approach
to executive compensation focuses on the decisionmaking process. 7 6
Are decisions improved by the use of compensation consultants and
independent compensation committees?77 Graef Crystal's role in
designing Ovitz's compensation is illustrative of the role of consul
tants. 78
The Disney court's decision may be justified on the basis that
shareholder litigation is a poor tool for challenging executive
compensation. That conclusion must be based, however, on an
assessment of the available alternatives for monitoring compensa
tion decisions. Several such alternatives exist. One alternative is
a regulatory solution-legal limits on the amount or type of
executive compensation that corporations can pay. The adoption of
Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) represents a limited regula
tory approach. Section 162(m) limits the deductibility of non
performance-based compensation payments exceeding $ 1 million per

74
See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 9-25 (working p aper dated Apr. 1 998)
(copy o n file with author) (describing components of CEO compensation).
75 See id. at 21 (describing "explosion in stock option grants" which "now constitute the
single largest component of CEO pay").
76
Recently a respected practitioner suggested to me that the problem of excessive
executive compensation could be addressed through carefu l guidelines o n the composition and
responsibilities of compensation committees akin to the proposals for audit committees
contained in the NASD Blue Ribbon Committee's Report and Recommendations on Improving
the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees ( 1999).
77
See, e.g., Chris O'Malley, Executive Pay Committees: It 's a Question of Objectivity,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 23, 1999, at A0 1 (identifying variety of conflicts that could
compromise independence o f compensation committee decisions).
78
Crystal, who advised the Disney board o n Ovitz's employment agreement, was later
quoted as saying that "nobody quantified [the total cost of the severance package] and I wish
we had." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. , 7 3 1 A.2d 342, 3 6 1 (Del. 1 998). In his book
Crystal describes the compensation consultant's role primarily as furnishing ammunition for
the CEO to justify his or her desired increase in compensation to the board of directors.
CRYSTAL, s upra note 59, at 42-50.
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year.79 The provision p rovides a good example of the shortcomings
of regulatory approaches to corporate governance . I n addition to
being subject to criticism for arbitrarily specifying a fixed dollar
amount limit without reference to corporate size, section 162 (m) has
had the perverse effect of causing many companies to increase
executive salaries to the $ 1 million cap80 or, alternatively, causing
companies to pay their executive with stock option grants worth
many times the limit because option grants are deemed
p erformance-based compensation and, hence, are exempted from the
cap .sl
An alternative governance approach is disclosure. Sensitive to
concerns about excessive executive compensation, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) amended its rules to mandate
disclosure of executive compensation in corporate p roxy
statements.82 As several commentators have observed, however,
this disclosure may have the perverse effect of increasing compensa
tion levels as corporate executives become increasingly aware of
p ayments made to their peers.83 Disclosure may actually provide
executives ammunition with which to negotiate pay increases from
their corporations.
Executive compensation has also been the target of increase d
shareholder activism.
I nstitutional investors have mounted
challenges to executive compensation through the shareholder

79 See James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align
Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 708-09 (1997) (describing
operation of Regulation 162(m)).
80
See John A. Byrne, That 's Some Pay Cap, Bill, Bus. WK. , Apr . 25, 1994, at 57
(explaining that cap has effectively established standard for executive p ay).
81
Repetti, supra note 79, at 709.
82
See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 3 3-6962 , 52 SEC
Doc. 1961 (Oct. 16, 1992) (imposing extensive disclosure requirements for executive
compensation); Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VA.t'ID. L. REV. 1129, 1161 (1993) (hereinafter Fisch, Proxy Regulation] (describing rationale
behind SEC's decision to require disclosure o f executive compensation).
83 See Donald C. Langevoort,
Commentary, Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and
Materiality, 48 CATH. U .L. REV. 93, 9 7 ( 1998) (observing that disclosure of compensation m ay
h ave caused corporations to raise pay faster "as peer payments become more visible"); see also
Federalist Society Conference, supra note 73 (noting that disclosure of executive compensa
tion m ay be counterproductive in that transparency may be counterproductive-if CEOs know
what their peers are being paid, each has ne gotiating ammunition to pressure h is o r her
corporation to pay comparably).
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proposal process, 84 by voting against compensation plans, 85 and by
withholding votes from the board of directors to protest excessive
compensation packages. 86 The SEC has facilitated the use of
shareholder voting to address executive compensation by reversing
its position under Rule 14a-8 and requiring corporations to include
shareholder proposals dealing with executive compensation on the
corporate proxy.87
Disney provides students with a good case study for examining
the operation of these governance alternatives. Students can review
the SEC-mandated disclosure in Disney's proxy statement and learn
how much CEO l\1ichael Eisner gets paid, as well as evaluate the
effectiveness of Disney's performance-based compensation
structure. 88 Students can also evaluate the quality of this disclosure
by reviewing articles in the popular press.89 Recent articles also
detail the response by institutional investors both to Eisner's
compensation package and to Disney's governance structure. We
discuss a number of the initiatives that investors have directed at
Disney, such as a recent proposal that Disney's future stock option

8'1

See, e.g., Corporate Governance: Firms Flex Their Muscles, PENSIONS & I NVESTMENTS,
Oct. 1 9 , 1 998, at 109 (stating that institutional investors filed 7 1 s hareholder proposals
addressing executive compe nsation during 1998 proxy season); Citigroup, 1999 SEC No
Action Letter, LEXlS 1 33 , at •· 1 0 (Feb. 4, 1 999) (describing proposal which sought, inter alia,
to establish "a cap on total CEO compensation as a m ultiple of pay of the lowest paid worker
at Citigroup").
85
See, e.g. , Richard C. Ferlauto, Labor's Growing Shareholder Activism Agenda,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, \'
i Iar. 23, 1998, at 12 (citing 1 996 Corporate Governance Review
data showing increase in shareholder voting cast against executive compensation plans).
86
See, e.g., James E. Heard & Patrick S. McGurn, Corporate Governance Audit for 1 998,
INSIGHTS, Dec. 1997, at 3 (describing "just vote no" efforts by activist investors in 1 997 proxy
season).
87 Previously the SEC has determined that shareholder proposals addressing executive
compensation could be excluded under Rule 14a - 8(c)(5) as matters relating to the ordinary
business operations of the issuer. See Fisch, Proxy Regulation, sztpra note 82, at 1 1 60-6 1
(describing SEC's original position and its reversal of that position in 1 9 9 1 ) .
8 8 Disney's 1 999 Proxy Statement, dated February 23, 1 999, is available on LEXIS
NEXIS in the E D GARPlus file. Michael Eisner's employment agreement is described on page
thirteen and his compensation is quantified in a table on page fourteen .
89 See, e.g., Derrick Z . Jackson, Falling into the Gap, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3 , 1 999, a t
A l 9 (describing Eisner as highest paid U.S. executive in 1 998 w i t h compensation totaling
$575.6 million).
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grants be performance-based90 and TIAA-CREF's proposals calling
for a more independent board of directors.91 We also observe that
CalPERS cast "no" votes for Disney's board nominees in an effort to
protest the board's lack of independence.92
Finally, I ask the student to consider possible corporate responses
and the degree to which these initiatives may change governance
policies. We observe that Disney recently bowed to institutional
pressure and agreed to add two additional independent directors to
its board.93 At the same time, we note the continued corporate
efforts to preclude institutional activism. For example, Disney
resisted the CWA shareholder proposal on performance -based stock
options, arguing that it is excludable because it deals with the
ordinary business operations of the company.94
Disney also
responded to the anticipated controversy at its annual meeting by
changing the location of that meeting from Anaheim to Kansas
City.95
B. CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

A second topic that tests the operation of the tools of corporate
governance is corporate philanthropy. Early in the course, in
connection with fiduciary duties, I teach a unit covering corporate
objectives. In this unit, we discuss the stakeholder model of the
corporation and contrast it with the principle of shareholder
primacy. I then ask the students whether corporate philanthropy
can be justified.
90 See Phyllis Feinberg, Disney Stars in First Proxy War: Union Wants 1999 Proposal on
Performance-Based Options, PENSIONS & I NVESTMENTS, Nov. 2, 1 998, a t 3 (detailing
s hareholder proposal submitted by Communication Workers of America requesting that all
future stock option grants be performance-based).
91
See Dave McNary, Stockholder Ends Bid to Open Disney Board, DAILY NEWS OF L.A. ,
Dec. 5, 1 998, at B2 (discussing T I AA- CREF's decision to withdraw its 1999 proposal after
D is ney agreed to add two independent directors following 35% shareholder vote in support
of CREF's 1 998 proposal).
92 Heard & McGurn, supra note 86, at 3.
9 3 See McNary, supra note 91 (illustrating how Disney caved to TIAA- CREF pressure).
91
See Feinberg, supra note 90 (describing Disney's efforts to persuade SEC that CWA
proposal can be excluded from proxy stateme nt).
fl5 See Claudia Eller, Disney Cottld Encounter Stormy Scene at Midwest Meeting Site, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at D l (questioning whether change of ann ual meeting site was
motivated by effort to avoid controversy) .
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Under either model, the rationale for corporate philanthropy is
unclear. Although corporations defend much of their charitable
giving in business terms, and this defense is reasonable, donations
that enhance long-term corporate value do not require different
legal treatment from other corporate expenditures. Nonetheless,
both corporate law and tax law afford special treatment to corporate
expenditures that are characterized as philanthropic. Specifically,
under the laws of most states, management need not defend
charitable giving as serving the interests of the corporation, no
matter how those interests are defined.96 Indeed, some statutes,
such as the New York Business Corporation Law, explicitly
authorize management to make charitable donations "irrespective
of corporate benefit."97 This language suggests that it is legal and,
at least in some cases, appropriate for corporations to make
donations that cannot be justified in business terms.98 The applica
tion of this principle presents a challenge for corporate governance.
The broad language of statutory authorizations of corporate
philanthropy make such philanthropy nearly impossible to challenge
through shareholder litigation. If corporate philanthropy need not
serve a business purpose, what standard should the courts apply in
reviewing a donation? One obvious possibility is the business
judgment rule, yet there are problems in applying the business
judgment rule to a non-business decision. 99 The potential for
management self-dealing in connection with corporate philanthropy
also raises a question about the suitability of applying the business
judgment rule's deferential standard of review. 1 00 An alternative
%
See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora 's Box: Managerial Discretion a nd the Problem
of C01porate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 602-03 ( 1 997) (describing current state
corporate law regulation of corporate philanthropy).
97
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §202 ( 1 2) (McKinney 1 9 99).
98 See Jill E . Fisch, Corporate Philanthropy is as American as Apple Pie, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1282, 1 326 ( 1 999) [hereinafter Fisch, Corporate Philanthropy] (distinguishing category
of corporate philanthropy that cannot be j ustified in terms of benefit to corporation).
n9 See Faith Stevelman K ahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence
and Power in Corporate and Securit1:es Law, 4 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 10 7 , 1 1 23 ( 1 997)
(arguing that " [t]he [e xisting] standards of fiduciary care and loyalty a n d the business
judgment rule cannot appropriately be applied, at least as they have traditionally been
defined i n the corporate case law, to the review of management's decisions re garding
charitable contributions").
1 00
Jill E . Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate Governance Perspective, 4 1
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 0 9 1 , 1 096 ( 1 997) [herein after Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy] .
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approach would p er m it courts to review donations in terms of their
size by applyin g som e variation of a reasonableness standard. 1 0 1 A s
the preceding m ate rial on executive compensation demonstr ated ,
however, the abse nce of judicially manageable standards for
determining whe n an exp enditure is reasonable, particularly when
viewed against the s cale of a large public corporation's earnings or
other expenditure s, m ake s such an evaluation impractical. 10 2 Even
a very large contribution represents an almost immate rial fraction
of the earnings of an I BM or Exxon.
Again, the p roble m is best illustrated by example . The decision
in Kahn v. Sullivan 1 0 3 de mons trates the impotence of share holde r
litigation as a tool for maintaining accountability in corporate
charitable giving. After Arm and Hammer , then CEO of Occide ntal
Petroleum, became dis satis fied with the responsiveness of the Los
Angeles Museum of Art to his overtur es, 1 0 4 he p roposed that
Occide ntal build a muse u m to house his art colle ction. The p rop osal
for the Armand Ha m m e r Museum and Cultural Center of Art, which
would cost $8 6 million / 0 5 was approve d by Occide ntal's board of
6 The
d.irectors. 1 0
p roje ct was subse quently challenged through
shareholder liti gation. The Occidental board appoint ed a special
litigation com mittee, and the litigation was rapidly resolved 1 0 7
through a cheap settle m ent, allowing the project to proceed with

101

See Kahn, sup ra n o te 9 6 , at 606-08 (describ ing D e l a w a re courts' use of reasona bleness
approac h).
102
See id. at 606 -0 (critici zin g D elaware courts' reliance on charitabl e con tribu �ion
7
provis ons o f In te rnal Re ven u e Code as measure of reasonabl eness for corporate con tnbu
i
tions).
103 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1 9 9 1 ) .
10� App arentl_Y the m use u m refuse d Hammer's request that galleries b e named after h i :U .
See Melvm A E isenbe r g, Corpo rate Conduct That Does Not Maxim ize Sharehold er Ga m:
Legal Conduct, Ethica l Condu ct, The Penu b ra Effect, Recipro city, the Prisoner 's Dile mm a,
m
Sheep 's Cloth i ng, Socia l Co ndu ct, and D isclosure, 28 STET. L. REV. 1, 23 ( 1998) (describing
history of Hamme r m us e u m proje ct).
1 05 Id.
1 06 See Kahn, 594
A 2 d at 5 2 - 55 (describing board's conside ration of museu m p roposal ).
1 07 The se t tlement n e
gotia tion p rocess was , i tself, somewhat que s tion a b l e . Se e Ka h n v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp . , Civ . A . N o . 10 8 08 1 989 D el. Ch. LEXIS 92, a t * 1 , * 1 3 (D e l . Ch.
,
y 1 9 1989) (de nyi n g " e x t rao rdinary motio n to prelimina rily enjoin a settle m e n t in the
,
J ul
proce �; of b e ing _negotiate d," b u t observing t h at n egot iation process raised " t roub lesome
I ssues that coul a b e h e a rd a t settl e m
e nt hearing).
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some minor modifications in terms. 1 08 Although other shareholders,
including CalPERS, objected to the settlement terms, 109 the
Delaware Court of Chancery ultimately approved the settlement,
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.1 1 0
In reviewing the settlement , the Delaware courts were faced with
the task of determining whether the settlement terms were fair and
reasonable. In doing so, courts weigh the likelihood that the suit
will be successful against the benefits provided to the corporation
and its shareholders by the settlement.1 1 1 In Kahn, the benefits
conferred by the settlement were, by all accounts, minimal; the
Court of Chancery described the settlement as "meager ." 1 12
Nonetheless, the courts concluded that the suit had little likelihood
of success on the merits because it was "highly probable" that the
business judgment rule would protect the directors' decision.1 1 3
The courts reached this conclusion despite the absence of any
proffered business purpose for the donation and despite no evidence
that the donation was reasonable in size. 1 14 The absence of a legal
re quirement that corporate philanthropy be justified by a business
purpose makes it virtually impossible for a court to review philan-

108

The terms of the settlem ent, which are described in the opinion of the D elaware Court
of Chancery, included changin g the name of the m useum to the "Occidental Petrole um
Cultural Center Building," and limiting Occidental's expenditures for the m useum to $50
million p lus an additional $10 million for cost overru ns. See Sullivan v. Hammer, No. Civ.
A. 10823, 1 990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 19 , at * 1 0- 1 1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1 990) (describing terms of
settlement). The additional $10 million expenditure was approved by Occiden tal's special
committee even before the appe al of the Court of Chancery decision approving the settlement
reached the Delaware Supreme Court. See Kahn, 594 A.2d at 58 (describin g special
committee meeting to approve expenditure).
109 Kahn, 594 A.2d at 50- 5 1 .
1 10
Id. at 63 .
111
See, e.g., Lewis v. Hirsch, No. Civ. A. 1 2 , 53 1 , 1 994 D e l . Ch. LEXIS 6 8 , at *6·7 (Del. Ch.
June 1 , 1 994) (describing legal standard for j udicial review o f proposed settlem ent).
1 12
Sullivan, 1 9 90 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 1 9, at * 3.
113
Kahn, 594 A.2d at 5 1 . As the Court of Chancery explained, " [t]he potential for ultimate
success on the merits here is, realistically, very poor. The business j udgment rule, as
consistently reiterated by the Delaware Supreme Court, stands as an almost impenetrable
barrier to the plaintiffs." Sulliuan, 1 990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 19, at * 1 5 .
1 14
The Court of Chancery, relyin g on Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 25 7 A.2d 39 8
(Del. Ch. 1 9 6 9), held that the test for whether a charitable contribution was proper was its
reasonableness. Sulliuan, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 19 , at * 19. The court then stated
conclusorily, " [f] rom the present record it is also clear that the present gift (as now limited)
is within the range of reasonableness." Id.; see also Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61 (detailing objectors'
argume nts that size of Occidental's contribution was unreasonable).
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thropic decisions under existing legal standards. As a result, the
Kahn court had little choice but to approve the settlement regard
less of its terms.
The opinions in Kahn actively discourage shareholders from
using litigation to challenge corporate philanthropy. Although Kahn
presents one of the more egregious cases of self-dealing masquerad
ing as philanthropy, the courts refused to look behind the Occidental
board's superficial justification of the expenditures in affording the
transactions the presumptive p rotection of the business judgment
rule. Thus, to the extent that corporate donations pose the risk of
management self-dealing, 115 shareholders must consider governance
alternatives.
Existing alternatives offer little potential for maintaining
management accountability with respect to corporate philanthropy.
Current law does not require corporations to disclose their charita
ble donations. Shareholder voting is not a viable alternative
because state law does not require shareholder approval of charita
ble expenditures, and it is unclear whether shareholder efforts to
vote on charitable giving would be permissible. 1 1 6 Moreover,
although shareholders have attempted to place the propriety of
corporate giving policies before the shareholders through use of
precatory shareholder proposals, the SEC generally has permitted
corporations to exclude such proposals on the ground that they
relate to the company's ordinary business operations. 1 1 7

1 15

See generally Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities and
the Agency Pro b lem, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1 147 (199 7) (describing risk of self-dealing
presented by corporate philanthropy).
1 16
Cf Lawrence A Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws:
Taking Back the Street ?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 4 1 4, 467-68 (1 998) (arguing that shareholder
proposed bylaws attempting to limit directors' power to adopt "poison pills" impermissibly
i n terfere with directors' authority under Delaware statute to manage corporation).
117
See, e.g., Pacific Telesis Group, 1 992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2 18 (Feb. 20, 1 992) (finding
proposal that registrant make contributions to Planned Parenthood excludable under Rule
1 4 a-8(c)(7) as "the determination to commence contributions to a particular charity"); S C E
Corp . , 1 992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2 1 4 (Feb. 20, 1 9 92) (holding proposal that re gistrant consider
donating prescribed amount of money to qualified charities which work to i mprove fisheries
and wildlife habitat excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(7) as "the determination to commence
contributions to a particular charity''); K mart Corp. , 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 350 (Mar. 4,
1 998) (finding proposal that registrant refrain from donating to organizations that perform
abortion excludable under Rule 1 4a8(c)(7) as dealing with "contributions to specific types of
organizations").
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To date, corporate philanthropy has not spurred the public and
regulatory attention that has been focused on executive compensa
tion. 1 1 8 Nonetheless, commentators have warned that philanthropy
Several
poses analogous risks of management self-dealing. 1 1 9
preliminary proposals seek to increase accountability through
analogous governance mechanisms, such as Congressman Paul
Gillmor's bill requiring public companies to disclose their charitable
donations to investors. 120
As with executive compensation, these proposals demonstrate the
weaknesses of existing governance tools. For example, mandated
disclosure of philanthropy raise s application issues similar to those
that plague disclosure of compensation: the definitional scope of
philanthropy, the problem of quantifying contributions of property
and employee time, and the extent to which cause-related marketing
programs should be classified as philanthropy. More broadly, any
increase in required corporate disclosures triggers concerns that
corporations will sacrifice business confidences and that disclosure
will unduly increase interference with day-to-day business opera
tions.

1 18

The relative absence of efforts to regulate corporate philanthropy is independently
worthy of comment. Charitable giving m ay provide a mechanism by which corporations can
purchase political favor while avoiding the legal restrictions on corporate political activity.
Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy, supra note 1 00, at 1 10 1-02. Accordingly, a p ublic choice
analysis may explain legislative reluctance to subject philanthropic decisions to increased
p ublic scrutiny.
119
See Barnard, supra note 1 1 5 , at 1 148 (warning that m uc h corporate giving is driven
by personal desires of executives rather than strategic considerations); K ahn, supra note 96,
at 624-25 (proposing mandatory disclosure of corporate contributions in order to deter
management self-dealing). The potential for manage ment self-dealing strengthens the
analytical connection between executive compensation and corporate philanthropy as
governance �sues.
120
Representative Gillmor has introduced two bills proposing alternative ways of
regulating corporate philanthropy. The first follows the disclosure policy e mployed by the
SEC with respect to executive compensation. It would require p ublic companies to report the
amounts and recipients of charitable contributions in connection with their pe riodic disclosure
to investors. H . R. 944, 1 05th Cong. (1997). The second bill , modeled on B erkshire
Hathaway's Berkshire Plan, would require p ublic companies to permit shareholders to
determine the recipients of corporate charitable giving. See Fisch, Corporate Philanthropy,
supra note 98, at 1 323 (describing two bills); see also Barnard, supra note 1 1 5 , at 1 1 70
(proposing modification of tax code to limit deductibility of corporate charitable contributions
that fail to meet specified criteria).
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IV. SOME P EDAGOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing material allows the students to evaluate the
effectiveness of shareholder litigation at addressing two problematic
areas in corporate governance. Mter an analysis of the substantive
issues and the potential for management self-dealing, the students
are able to recognize the substantial limitations on shareholder
litigation as a governance tool. Indeed, courts have essentially
insulated these particular subjects from judicial review by relegat
ing challenges to the little-used doctrine of waste and ignoring the
potential for management self-dealing that, in the context of the
duty of loyalty, typically justifies enhanced judicial scrutiny.
Our discussion then considers whether these limitations on
shareholder litigation are appropriate. We consider the concern of
lawyer-driven litigation that animates calls for litigation reform and
debate whether shareholder litigation on these topics presents the
risk of abusive litigation. We also consider the viability of gover
nance alternatives. While executive compensation has been the
target of considerable experimentation in regulatory reform,
corporate philanthropy has received comparably little attention.
Yet, the materials demonstrate that both topics present consistent
examples of management excesses that corporate law appears
unable to remedy. Indeed, these topics demonstrate the failure of
corporate law to address essential problems stemming from the
separation of ownership and control.
We conclude by considering reform efforts that run counter to the
current popular wisdom. Should the procedural or substantive rules
governing shareholder litigation be modified to provide more
meaningful review, either in general or in particular subject areas?
Students have at their disposal an illustration of this approach in
the one area in which Delaware courts have applied a more rigorous
standard of review: management's use of anti-takeover defenses. 1 2 1

121

See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (De l . 1 9 85) (adopting
intermediate standard of scrutiny for manage ment's use of anti-takeover defenses to resist
hostile tender offer); Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 248
( 1 989) (describing Unocal test).
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Chuck Yablon has made a similar proposal with respect to
compensation decisions and suggested that courts use a proportion
ality test to evaluate executive compensation rather than a deferen
tial waste or business judgment standard. 122 Under Yablon's test,
courts would ask whether executive compensation is reasonable in
light of the expected benefits to the corporation. 1 23 Yablon argues
that a proportionality test would be workable and, if limited to an
area like executive compensation, would not present significant
risks of litigation abuse. 124 Using the tools provided by our analysis
of shareholder litigation, students can analyze this claim and
discuss the workability of Yablon's proposal.
Finally, students can consider the potential deterrent effect of
this regulatory change on corporate behavior. Too frequently our
teaching emphasizes the lawyer's role in litigation, yet the business
lawyer commonly acts as an adviser when the client seeks to
minimize the risk of litigation. In these cases, legal rules serve as
the backdrop for corporate transactional decisionmaking. Yablon
claims that the potential for greater judicial involvement would
deter management overreaching by invigorating board deliberations
over compensation decisions. 125 He offers an example of how his
proposal might affect the dialogue between a CEO and his
counsel. 1 26 It can be particularly useful for students to play the role
of corporate counsel and consider the way legal standards can affect
their advice to a corporate board or their ability to deal with a
recalcitrant CEO.
V. CONCLUSION
In teaching students about the role of shareholder litigation, I
hope to leave them with a richer appreciation for the nuances in the
currently ongoing debates about litigation reform. I want my
students to understand the concerns about litigation abuse as well

;zz
Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1 867, 1 897-98 ( 1 992) (book review).
123
Id. at 1897.
12�
Id. at 1 90 1 .
125
Id. at 1 897-98.
126
ld.
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as the economic structure of shareholder litigation that creates the
potential for this abuse. At the same time, I do not want students
to fall prey to the Nirvana fallacy. The role of shareholder litigation
must be understood within the context of corporate law's effort to
address the agency costs associated with the separation of owner
ship and control. Limitations on the effectiveness of governance
mechanisms have the potential to sacrifice management account
ability. Accordingly, reform efforts must consider the availability of
alternative methods of controlling management self-dealing. By
seeking to cultivate a thoughtful approach to the role of litigation in
corporate governance , I try to keep my students questioning the
purposes served by the legal rules they study.

